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ALLOWING FREE REIGN IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: HAs

THE COURT ALLOWED Too MUCH DEFERENCE WHERE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ARE AT STAKE?-United States v. Stanley-

In the aftermath of World War II, the 1947 Nuremberg
medical trials1 laid the foundation for future restrictions on
medical experimentation on human beings.2
The Nazi
atrocities revealed at Nuremberg provided the world with the
impetus for implementation of international law, commentary,
and discussion on experimentation upon uninformed or4
The Nuremberg Code,
unconsenting human subjects.'
emerging from the trials and subsequently adopted by the
United States Military Tribunal, established a standard to
judge scientists who experimented with human subjects. 5 The
United States developed the Code, which protects all citizenssoldiers as well as civilians.6
The twenty-three defendants in the Nuremberg Medical
Case performed a number of experiments and projects upon
unknowing and unconsenting human beings.
These
experiments included injection of virulent typhus into prisoners
7
to ensure a ready supply of virus for typhus experiments,
8
forced ingestation of seawater to test desalinization processes,
experimental bone transplantation, 9 and injection of malaria to
1. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (International Military Tribunal 1946).
2. Bassiouni, Baffes & Evrard, An Appraisal of Human ExperimentationIn International
Law And Practices: The Need For InternationalRegulation Of Human Experimentation, 72 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1597, 1639 (1981) [hereinafter Bassiouni].

3. Id. at 1639.
4. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946).
5. The Articles of the Nuremberg Tribunal require that an experiment be performed
only after obtaining the voluntary consent of a subject who has the legal capacity to consent
after that subject has been informed of the possible risks of the experiment. Id.
6. See, e.g., Mulford, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REV. 99, 105 n.
34 (1967) (Military personnel cannot be compelled to submit to nontherapeutic procedures)
(citing Johnson, Civil Rights of Military Personnel Regarding Medical Care and Experimental
Procedures, 117 SCIENCE 212-15 (1953)).
7. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 1639.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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test malaria immunity."
Following the trials, fifteen of the
defendants were convicted of committing war crimes and
crimes against humanity." Of the fifteen defendants found
guilty of conducting nonconsensual experimentation on human
beings, seven were put to death, five were sentenced to life
imprisonment, two were sentenced to twenty years
imprisonment, and one was sentenced to fifteen years
imprisonment. 2
In 1958, Master Sergeant James Stanley of the United
States Army, in the course of Army experimentation, was
asked to drink a clear liquid which appeared to be a glass of
water. 3 Stanley volunteered and was led to believe that the
nature of the experiments were to test chemical warfare
equipment and clothing designed to protect against chemical
warfare agents. 4 Unknown to Stanley, the liquid contained
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD)."
Stanley ingested the
dangerous drug on four occasions in 1958 and as a result
experienced severe reactions including hallucinations soon
after ingestion, but he did not know the source of these
reactions. 16 Stanley was never informed of the true nature of
the testing program, nor of the risks involved. 7
10. Id. While such tests were being done in the United States at the same period of
time, most were performed on animals or tested with control groups with appropriate
safeguards when performed on human subjects. Id. at 1640.
11. Id. at 1640 n.221.
Crimes against humanity include murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumaneacts committed against any civilian
population, before or during a war, or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of any
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Id.

12. J. APPELMAN,
[hereinafter APPELMAN].

MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 139-40 (1954)

13. Stanley v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 327, 328 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
14. Brief for Appellant, United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (No. 86-393).
15. Stanley, 549 F. Supp. at 328.
16. Stanley v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 474, 476 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
17. Id. at 476
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Stanley was discharged from the military in 1969,"8 as
he was unable to perform his military duties efficiently. He
soon began to beat his wife and children violently.1 9 As a
civilian, Stanley was never informed of the administration of
LSD,2 0 was never given follow-up medical care, 21 and
eventually his bizarre behavioral changes resulted in a
breakdown and dissolution of his family life and marriage one
year after his discharge.' In 1975 Stanley was notified for the
first time by letter that he had secretly been given LSD in
1958.' This was the first time Stanley realized he had been
used as an unconsenting subject for the study of the long
range medical and psychological effects of LSD, rather than
being a volunteer in testing chemical warfare equipment and
clothing as he had been led to believe.24
After bringing suit against several named defendants,
including the United States Government, for a violation of his
constitutional rights,' the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,26
held that the Constitution provides him with no remedy, as his
injuries were inflicted in the performance of his duties in the
Nation's Armed Forces.27 The Court set precedent in holding
that unconsenting, unknowing military personnel may be used
for experiments, have their constitutional rights violated, and
18. Id.
19. Id. at 476 n.2.

20. id.
21. Id. at 477.
22. Id. at 476 n.2.
23. Brief for Appellant, United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (No. 86-393).
"The letter solicited [Stanley's] participation in a follow-up study of the 'volunteers' who
participated in the 1958 LSD experiments." Id.
24. Stanley, 574 F. Supp. at 476.
25. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
26. Id. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices
Rhenquist, White, Blackmun and Powell; Justice O'Connor filed a separate opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part; Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens. Id.

27. Id.
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have no legal redress through the courts.' In describing the
nature of such a line of cases, Judge Gibbons in Jaffe v. United
States' stated:
That any judicial tribunal in the world, in the last
fifth of this dismal century, would choose to
place a class of persons outside the protection
against human rights violations provided by the
admonitory law of intentional torts is surprising.
That it should be an American court will dismay
persons the world over concerned with human
rights and will embarrass our Government.'
The implications of United States v. Stanley are not
easily discernable. In light of the Military's adoption of the
Nuremberg Code in the 1940's,3 ' and the line of Supreme
Court precedent dealing with Military immunity from liability
for tortious conduct and violations of constitutional rights,3 2
the decision signifies an alarming extension by the Supreme
Court to clothe the United States Armed Forces with absolute
immunity for decisions made concerning virtually any military
conduct performed upon military personnel within "the line
of duty." It is for this reason the vigorous dissenting opinion
by Justice Brennan will be of particular importance to this
comment in exploring the moral and legal justifications for the
majority opinion.

28. Id at 686 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id at 709-10
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. 663 F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir. 1981).
30. Id. at 1250.
31. "1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. The duty
and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who
initiates, directs, and engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which
may not be delegated to another with impunity." APPELmA.,
supra note 12, 147 (quoting
United States v. Brandt (The Medical Case), 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg
Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, at 181 (1949)).

32. See infra notes 42 and 43.
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BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

In the 1950's, military intelligence and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) began testing chemical and
biological materials, including LSD. These programs were
purportedly designed to "determine the potential effects of
chemical or biological agents when used operationally against
individuals unaware that they had received the drug," including
drug testing on "unwitting, nonvolunteer Americans."33 In 1959
a Staff Study of the United States Army Intelligence Corps
recognized the moral and legal implication of its conduct as
it discussed its covert administration of LSD to soldiers:
It was always a tenet of Army Intelligence that
the basic principle of dignity and welfare of the
individual will not be violated . . . . In
intelligence, the stakes involved and the interests
of national security may permit a more tolerant
interpretation of moral-ethical values, but not
legal limits, through necessity . . . . Any claim
against the U.S. government for alleged injury
due to EA 1729 [LSD] must be legally shown to
have been due to the material. Proper security
and appropriate operational techniques can
protect the fact of employment of EA 1729.'
James Stanley brought suit in the Southern District of
Florida after filing claims with the United States Army and
the CIA, both of which were denied." Stanley's complaint
33. S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. Book I, 385 (1976).
34. Id. at 416-17.
35. Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146, 1149 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981).
On November 16, 1977, Stanley received a letter from the U.S. Army
Claims Service informing him that his claims under the FTCA were not
payable since "[i]njuries to individuals incurred while on duty with the
United States Army are considered to be incident to the individual's
service, Feres v. United States." The letter further advised him that he
could file a suit in the appropriate United States District Court if he was
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alleged that several defendants were negligent in various
respects in their administration of the experimentation
program. The complaint specifically alleged that:
(1) Defendants knew or should have known that
LSD is a consciousness and behavior altering
drug capable of producing irreparably harmful
results, including death, and that the drug would
affect different persons in different unpredictable
ways; (2) Defendants breached their duty to warn
plaintiff; (3) Defendants failed to take adequate
precautions; (4) Defendants negligently failed to
debrief plaintiff after administering the drug to
advise of the potentially hazardous physiological
and psychological effects; (5) Defendants
negligently failed to continue to monitor the
plaintiff following the experiment; (6) Defendants
negligently failed to obtain plaintiffs informed
consent?3
Stanley claimed that, as a result of this negligence, he
suffered severe physical and mental injuries which caused him
continual problems in the performance of his military duties
and ultimately disrupted his marriage. 37 As a result of the
LSD exposure, Stanley's inexplicable behavioral changes
eventually resulted in the breakdown and dissolution of his
marriage and family life.' Stanley was thereafter unable to
perform his military duties efficiently and was reduced in rank
for inefficiency. 39 At times he would be absent without leave,
dissatisfied with the action taken on his claim.
Id. (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)).
36. Stanley, 639 F.2d at 1149 n.3.
37. Id at 1149.
38. Brief for Petitioner Appellant, United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (No.
86-393).

39. Stanley v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 474, 476 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (citing plantiff's
amended complaint 5, Stanley, 574 F. Supp. 474 (No. 78-8141-CIV-Jag)).
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and could not recall his whereabouts when questioned."
Before being administered the LSD, Stanley maintained an
unblemished record; he earned various military honors and
intended to pursue a promising military career.41
Stanley initially filed a Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA") suit in the district court.4 2 The district court granted
the Government summary judgment on the ground that the
4
suit was barred under the doctrine of Feres v. United States, 1
which precludes governmental FTCA liability for injuries to
servicemen resulting from activity "incident to service."" The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded the case,
concluding that Stanley had a colorable constitutional claim
40. Brief for Respondent, United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (No. 86-393).
41. Id.
42. Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, No. 78-8141, (S.D. Fla., May 14, 1979).
43. Id. (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.135 (1950)). This comments' focus will
be primarily on Stanley's Bivens claim against the federal officials who allegedly violated
Stanley's constitutional rights. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Court in Bivens held that a search and seizure that
violates the Fourth Amendment can give rise to an action for damages against the offending
federal officials even in the absence of a statute authorizing such relief. Id. at 396. This
holding led the way to the general principle that where constitutional rights have been
violated, an action for damages brought directly under the Constitution for the violation of
constitutional rights by federal officials could be maintained. Id. at 395. The thrust of the
majority opinion is concerned with the interpretation of Bivens in relation to Wallace v.
Chappell, 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981), and how one case establishes the outcome of the
other.
44. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). The importance of the "incident
to service" finding is essential to the majority opinion in the case. Stanley argued that his
participation in the chemical warfare testing program should not be considered "activity
incident to service" because he was a volunteer and had been given a release from his regular
duties in order to participate in the program. Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir.
1981). Additionally, Stanley contended that the Government's activity in such a testing
program was illegal and thus should not be covered by the Feres doctrine. Id. The court of
appeals held that such a contention was unwarranted. Id. at 1154-55. "Appellant has no
sound authority for his assertion that the voluntary status of his participation in the program
necessitates the conclusion that Feres should not control." Id. at 1150. Feres has been
applied in cases involving a wide range of voluntary activity. See, e.g., Charland v. United
States, 615 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1980) (serviceman killed while voluntarily participating in a
Navy Seal Training exercise); Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980)
(serviceman injured while participating voluntarily in Naval experiment designed to test the
effectiveness of certain protective clothing when exposed to sulphur mustard gas); Loeh v.
United States, No. 77-2065-B and 77-2023-B, slip op. (S.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 1979) (serviceman
injured when administered LSD while participating voluntarily in Army drug experimentation
program).
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pursuant to the Court's ruling in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics,5 whereby a violation of
constitutional rights can give rise to a damages action against
offending federal officials even in the absence of a specific
statute authorizing appropriate relief for such violations. The
Court narrowed this holding by providing that a Bivens claim
may be defeated if there are special factors counselling a
court to hesitate in granting the requested damages, or where
there is an explicit congressional declaration that there is
another exclusive remedial scheme to address and remedy the
violations complained of.'6 The government, in response to
the court of appeals remand, contended that a remand would
be futile because Feres would bar any claims that Stanley
could raise either under the FTCA or directly under the
constitution against individual officers under Bivens.47 The
case was remanded"8 and Stanley amended his complaint to
add claims against unknown individual federal officers for
violations of his constitutional rights' 9 Additionally, Stanley
specifically alleged that the United States' failure to warn,
monitor, or treat him after he was discharged constituted a
separate tort, which was not incident to service because it
occurred subsequent to his discharge, within the Feres
exception to the FTCA.50
On remand, the district court dismissed Stanley's FTCA
claim because the alleged negligence occurring after his
45. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388 (1971).

46. Id. at 396.
47. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 672 (1987).
48. Stanley v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
49. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized that there is a constitutional right to be
free to decide for oneself whether to submit to drug therapy. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct.
2442 (1982). Courts have recognized this constitutional protection as a liberty or privacy
interest associated with the penumbral right to privacy, bodily integrity, or personal integrity.
Id. at n.3. "This right to be free from unwanted administration of drugs has also been
associated with First Amendment rights because the power to produce ideas is fundamental
to our cherished right to communicate ..... " Id.
50. See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954). See also infra notes 136-68 and
accompanying text.
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discharge was not "separate and distinct from any acts
occurring before discharge, so as to give rise to a separate
actionable tort not barred by the Feres doctrine."" The court
refused, however, to dismiss the Bivens claims against the
individual defendants, rejecting the Government's argument
that the considerations giving rise to the Feres exception in
relation to an FTCA claim, constitute special factors as
alluded to in Bivens which would defeat a Bivens claim. 2
Stanley filed his second amended complaint and named
as defendants nine individuals and the Board of Regents of
the University of Maryland where the drug testing took
place.5" He asserted civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1985." Before the Government's motion to dismiss was
ruled upon, the United States Supreme Court issued its
decision in Chappell v. Wallace,55 which held that "[e]nlisted
military personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages
from a superior officer for alleged constitutional violations."5 6
The district court reaffirmed its prior decision.57 It concluded
that despite the broadly stated holding of the case, Chappell
did not totally bar Bivens actions when a "[m]ember of the
military brings suit against a superior officer for wrongs which
51. Stanley, 549 F. Supp. at 329. The court reached its conclusion by examining the
reasoning of the fifth circuit and its reliance on Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429
(E.D. Va. 1980). The court found that Stanley failed to allege a distinct tort arising entirely
post-discharge, as established in Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979)
(Feres doctrine does not bar claims arising from conduct occurring entirely post-discharge).
See infra notes 135-68 and accompanying text.
52. Stanley, 549 F. Supp. at 330. The Court in Bivens held that such an action inferred
directly from the Constitution might not be appropriate when there are "special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971), or where
there is an "[e]xplicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's
violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents, but
must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress."
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97.
53. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 674 (1987).
54. Id.

55. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
56. Id. at 305.
57. Stanley v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
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involve direct orders in the performance of military duty and
the discipline and order necessary thereto,""8 factors that in its
view were not connected to Stanley's claims. Nor could the
court find congressionally proscribed remedies 9 of such an
exclusivity that Bivens contemplated would preclude recovery.'
The court of appeals affirmed the district court decision
relying on the same reasoning.61

11.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

A. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court's opinion, written by Justice Scalia,
begins by summarizing the court of appeal's ruling on Stanley's
Bivens claim.62 "In our view the court took an unduly narrow
view of the

.

.

.

circumstances in which courts should

decline to permit non-statutory damages actions for injuries
arising out of military service. 63

The opinion traced the development of the theory
stated in Bivens which identified "special factors counselling
58. Id. at 479.
59. See Veterans Benefits Act, Pub. L. No. 85-857, 72 Stat. 1105 (codified as amended
at 38 U.S.C. § 301 (1976)).
60. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
61. The Court did not think that Congress' activity in the military justice field was a
special factor precluding Stanley's claim, as "[t]hose intramilitary administrative procedures
which the court found adequate to redress the servicemen's racial discrimination complaints
in Chappell are clearly inadequate to compensate Stanley for the violations complained of
here." Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U.S. 296, 303 (1983)).
62. The Court's opinion primarily focuses on the Bivens claim in light of Chappell. The
majority felt that the Court of Appeals took an "[u]nduly narrow view of the circumstances
in which courts should decline to permit nonstatutory damages actions for injuries arising out
of military service." United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 678 (1987).
63. Id. The Court at the outset of the opinion made it clear that it granted certiorari
"[blecause the Circuit courts have not been uniform in their interpretation of the holding in
Chappell." Stanley, 483 U.S. at 676. See, e.&, Jordan v. National Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99,
107-08 (3d Cir. 1986); Trerica v. Summons, 755 F.2d 1081, 1082-84 (4th Cir. 1985); Mollnow
v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Gaspard
v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1983), cet denied sub non. Sheehan v.
United States, 466 U.S. 975 (1984).

288

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[\7OL VIu

hesitation, in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.""
In Bivens, the Court held that a search and seizure that
violates the fourth amendment can give rise to an action for
damages against the offending federal officials, even in the
absence of statute authorizing such relief."' The Court had
qualified the holding by stating that if there are "special
factors counselling hesitation," or if there was an "explicit
congressional declaration that injured parties have an
alternative remedy equally effective" such an action could not
be maintained.' This cautionary language remained only as
guiding dictum until the Court decided Chappell v. Wallace,
where the dictum became legal precedent.67
In Chappell, the Court found "factors counselling
hesitation" in "the need for special regulation in relation to
military discipline,6 and the consequent need and justification
for a special and exclusive system of military justice .... .",69
The plaintiffs in Chappell brought suit alleging that, because
of their race, their superior officers had "[f]ailed to assign
them desirable duties, threatened them, gave them low
performance evaluations, and imposed penalties of unusual
severity.' 7 The Court concluded that factors such as the
"unique disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment"
64. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 679.
65. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
66. Id. Subsequently, the Court held that a Bivens action could be brought under the
due process clause of the fifth amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and under
the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14 (1980).
In each case, in dictum, it was emphasized that "special factors

counselling hesitation" or an "explicit congressional declaration" that another remedy is
exclusive would bar such an action. Davis, 442 U.S. at 246-47; Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19.
67. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). On the same day, the Court also
decided Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), which also made the Bivens dictum binding
precedent.
68. See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
69. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300.
70. Id. at 297. Chappell reversed the lower court's tests for determining whether a
constitutional damage remedy applied on behalf of minority servicemen who alleged that
because of their race their superior officers "[failed to assign them desirable duties,
threatened them, gave them low performance evaluations, and imposed penalties of unusual
severity." Id. at 297-98.
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and Congress' activity in the field of the Military71 should be
a bar to the plaintiffs in Chappell, and that therefore, a Bivens
action against the plaintiffs' superior officers7 2 would be
inappropriate.73
The Court next addressed Stanley's two arguments at
distinguishing Chappell. First, Stanley argued that the
defendants in this case were not his superior military officers,
and indeed may have been civilian personnel.74 Accordingly,
Stanley argued, the chain of command or superior-subordinate
concerns at the heart of the Chappell decision would not be
compromised by allowing Stanley remedies against the named
71. The Court held that under the U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.14, Congress has the
power "[To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
Id. at 301. Thus, it was contemplated that the Legislative Branch has plenary control over
the rights, duties, and responsibilities of the Military Establishment. Id.
72. The Court's conclusion was based on the judiciary's interest in protecting the
constitutional rights of service personnel which was fully considered and adequately
safeguarded through the congressionally imposed system of military administrative procedures.
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987). In response, the dissenting opinion points
out that the Veterans Benefits Act is irrelevant
[w]here, as here, the injuries alleged stem . . . from pain and suffering

in forms not covered by the Act.The U[niform] C[ode] [of] M[ilitary]
J[ustice] assists only when the soldier is on active duty and the tortfeasor
is another military member. Here, incontrast to the situation in Chappell,
no intramilitary system 'provides for the

.

.

.

remedy' of Stanley's

complaint.
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 706 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386,
388 (1983) (special factors counselling hesitation found because claims were fully cognizable
within an elaborate remedial system, providing comprehensive, meaningful, and constitutionally
adequate remedies). Moreover, the military compensation system is not designed to redress
many of the intentional tort injuries. Zillman, Intramilitary Tort Law: Incidence To Service
Meets ConstitutionalTort, 60 N.C.L. REV. 489 (1982) [hereinafter Zillman].
A seriously injured battery victim may benefit to the extent of receiving
free medical care and recompense for disability. However, a 'military
determination that the injury was due to plaintiffs willful misconduct .
. would bar any eligibility under the compensation system. Victims of
false imprisonment or defamation seek damages not compensable under
the administrative benefits scheme. Individual redress in the military
intentional torts cases includes more than monetary damages.
Id.
73. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 706.
74. Id.
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individuals."

Stanley's second contention was that there was no
evidence that his injuries were incident to service, as there
were not enough facts yet disclosed to determine the character
of the drug testing program, the titles and roles of the various
individual defendants, or Stanley's duty status when he was at
the Maryland testing ground.76 The Court disposed of this
contention by reasoning that "[t]o give controlling weight to
those facts,

.

.

is to ignore our plain statement in

Chappell that [t]he 'special factors' that bear on the propriety
of respondent's Bivens action also formed the basis of this
Court's decision in Feres v. United States.

77

The Court next analyzed factors involved in establishing
a rule which would apply the special factors to suits similar to
Stanley's. 7' The two major considerations which the Court
contemplated in establishing its test was premised on the
amount of intrusion into Military affairs that the Court was
willing to undertake, 79 and the depth of such intrusion." That
75. Id. at 680. The Court has often noted "the peculiar and special relationship of the
soldiers to his superiors," United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954), and has
acknowledged that "the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to
meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty ....
" Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion). The overriding justification in the majority opinion is
based on what the Court has explained by "[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the
soldier to his superiors, [and] the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline...
." Brown, 348 U.S. at 112.
But see Stanley, 483 U.S. at 702 n.25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Stanley was administered LSD without his knowledge so he could not have disobeyed any
order given to him. Id This fact alone simply removes the case one step further from -the
concern for obedience to orders that the Court chose to protect in ChappelL Id.
76. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 680.
77. Id. (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1982)).
78. In trying to establish a clear line for determining when such cases should be heard,
the Court stated that "[t]his is essentially a policy judgment, and there is no scientific or
analytic demonstration of the right answer." Stanley, 483 U.S. at 681.
79. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 681 (emphasis in original text)
[Tjhere are varying levels of generality at which one may apply "special
factors" analysis. Most narrowly, one might require reason to believe that
in the particular case the disciplinary structure of the military would be
affected-thus not even excluding all officer-subordinate suits, but allowing,
for example, suits for officer conduct so egregious that no responsible
officer would feel exposed to suit in the performance of his duties.
Somewhat more broadly, one might disallow Bivens actions whenever the
officer-subordinate relationship underlay the suit. More broadly still, one
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determination "depends upon how prophylactic one thinks the
prohibition should be," that is, how much disruption of military
discipline and how much intrusion into Military affairs should
the judiciary permit." The Court squared its ruling on policy
grounds stating:
Today, no more than when we wrote Chappell,
do we see any reason why our judgment in the
Bivens context should be any less protective of
military concerns than it has been with respect
to FTCA suits . . . In fact, if anything we
might have felt more free to compromise military
concerns in the latter context, since we were
confronted with an explicit congressional
authorization for judicial involvement that was,
on its face, unqualified; whereas here we are
confronted with an explicit constitutional
authorization for Congress "[t]o make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces", 2 and rely upon inference for our
own authority to allow money damages. 3
One of the overriding concerns expressed in the
majority opinion was the degree of disruption within the
Military which would follow by the rule proposed by Stanley.
The majority was primarily concerned with creating a test for
liability which would call into question military discipline and
might disallow them in the officer-subordinate situation and also beyond
that situation when it affirmatively appears that military discipline would
be affected .. . .Fourth, as we think appropriate, one might disallow
Bivens actions whenever the injury arises out of activity "incident to
service." And finally, one might conceivably disallow them by servicemen
entirely.
Id

80. Id
81. Id.
82. U.S. CoNrST. art. I, § 8, cl.14.
83. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682.
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decision-making, and the judiciary's role as an intruder into
military matters."
Based on these concerns, the Court
reasoned that the incident to service test, as set forth in Feres,
"provides a line that is relatively clear and that can be
85
discerned with less extensive inquiry into military matters."

The Court next considered two factors established in
the court of appeals decision which, as the Court explained,
were inapplicable to the case at bar. First, the Court found
it irrelevant to a special factors analysis whether Stanley, or
any other serviceman, is afforded an adequate federal remedy
for his injury. 6 The Court stated that the inquiry is not the
fact that Congress has or has not established another form of
relief that guides a special factors inquiry, but the degree of
uninvited judiciary intrusion into military concerns. 7 Second,
the court of appeals erroneously relied on the statement in
Chappell which stated that the Court "[n]ever held
that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian
courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of
military service."' The Court distinguished this statement in
Chappell by pointing out that it was made in relation to cases
which sought to halt or prevent continuing constitutional
violations, rather than seeking an award for money damages
for past constitutional violations.8 9
Based on the preceding analysis, the Court held that no
Bivens remedy was available for injuries which amounted to
violations of Stanley's constitutional rights.'
Military
personnel's injuries and violations of constitutional rights are
barred from judicial remedy when such injuries "'arise out of,
84. Id. at 682. Such intrusion would occur through compelled depositions, trial
testimony by military officers concerning details of military commands and decisions, and
intrusive litigation discovery. Id.

85. Id. at 683.
86. Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1986).
87. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682.
88. Id. (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)).

89. See id at 682-83.
90. Id. at 683-84.
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or are [inflicted] in the course of activity incident to [military]
service." '9 1

B. Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in
agreed with the Court's analysis as applied to Stanley's
cause of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act,93 and with
the Court's analysis of Chappell v. Wallace,94 that there is
generally no Bivens remedy available for injuries that arise out
of the course of activity incident to military service.9 5 In
O'Connor's view, however, the conduct of the Military as
alleged by Stanley, "[i]s so far beyond human decency that as
a matter of law it simply cannot be considered a part of the
Military mission."' Further, the extension of Chappell by the
majority should not "[i]nsulate [Military] defendants from
liability for deliberate and calculated exposure of otherwise
healthy military personnel to medical experimentation without
their consent, outside of any combat, combat training
and for no other reason than to gather information on the
effect of [LSD] on human beings."'97 Finally, after referring to
the United States Military's role in the criminal prosecution of
Nazi officials who experimented on human beings, Justice
O'Connor concluded by stating that the victims of such
egregious conduct should at least be compensated for the
injuries which they sustained; as "[o]ur Constitution's promise
part,92

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 684 (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)).
Id. at 708-10.
28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1949).
462 U.S. 296 (1983).

95. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 701.

96. Id. at 709.
97. Id.

294

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. VIl

of due process of law guarantees this much.""8
2. Justice Brennan
Justice Brennan summed up his dissenting opinion
stating that "[tlhe principles of accountability embodied in
Bivens-that no official is above the law, and that no right
should be without a remedy-apply."" The heart of Justice
Brennan's dissent lies in an analysis of governmental sovereign
immunity afforded to Military officials. By interpreting Bivens,
Chappell, and Feres as the majority did, Justice Brennan
argues that the result grants absolute immunity from liability
for money damages to all federal officials who intentionally
violate the constitutional rights of those serving in the
military."° Justice Brennan's dissent focuses on two areas:
first, the governing precedent, showing that the majority
confers absolute immunity on federal officials without
considering longstanding case law which establishes the general
rule that such officials are liable for damages caused by their
intentional violations of well-established constitutional rights;" 1
second, the majority's "unwarranted extension of the narrow
exception" to the immunity rule created in Chappell, stating
that "[t]he Court's reading of Chappell tears it from its
analytical moorings, ignores the considerations decisive to our
12
immunity cases, and leads to an unjust and illogical result."
Justice Brennan began by arguing that a special factors
analysis, as dictated by Bivens, demands a determination of
the propriety of a damages award against, in this context,
military officials. 3 But the inquiry also extends into whether
the federal officials charged are entitled to absolute immunity
98.
99.

Id. at 710.
Id. at 706 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

100.

Id. at 690.

101.

Id. at 691.

102.
103.

Id.
Id.
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from money damages, which the majority opinion did not
consider at all." a Therefore, the issue of immunity "[and] the
'special factors' inquiry are the same; the policy considerations
that inform them are identical, and a court can examine these
considerations only once."10'
Once both the special factors
and immunity issues are decided, they should not and do not
produce different outcomes. If the Court establishes there are
special factors prohibiting Stanley's Bivens claim, then
defendants maintain absolute immunity. This results in an
outcome that creates a conflict between a typical special
factors analysis and case law governing governmental
immunity. "The practical consequences of a holding that no
remedy has been authorized against a public official are
essentially the same as those flowing from a conclusion that
the official has absolute immunity.""3° This, Justice Brennan
maintains, is at odds with case law concerning governmental
07
immunity."
104. Id.
105. Id. at 692. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
If, as the government argues, all officials exercising discretion were
exempt from personal liability, a suit under the Constitution could provide
no redress to the injured citizen, nor would it in any degree deter federal
officials from committing constitutional wrongs . . .. The extension of
absolute immunity from damages liability to all federal executive officials
would seriously erode the protection provided by basic constitutional
guarantees.
Id. at 505.
106. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 693 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring)). See also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), where the Court
explicitly acknowledged that the immunity question and the "special factors" question are
intertwined. Id. at 246. The Court recognized that "[a] suit against a Congressman for
putatively unconstitutional actions taken in the course of his official conduct does raise special
concerns counselling hesitations" under Bivens but held that "[t]hese concerns are coextensive
with the protections afforded by the Speech or Debate clause, . . . which shields federal
legislators with absolute immunity." Id. Absent immunity, the Court. said, legislators ought
to be liable in damages as are ordinary persons. Id. Justice Brennan argues that the same
analysis should apply to military personnel who make decisions in military matters. "Absent
immunity, they are liable for damages, as are all citizens." Stanlyq, 483 U.S. at 692.
107. See infra notes 90-116 and accompanying text.
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Addressing the majority's opinion, and in response to
the special factors/immunity analysis,"~ Justice Brennan points
out that he cannot produce "'any reason for creating' an
equivalency between ....

."

an immunity and special factors

analysis because, neither he nor the Court can decide the
separate immunity analysis without more facts indicating the
functions and roles performed by the defendant officials."°
Historically, the Court has conferred qualified immunity
to most public servants.110 In Butz v. Economou,1" the Court
balanced "[t]he need to protect officials who are required to
exercise their discretion and the related public interest in
encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority,"1 2
against the crucial importance of a damages remedy in
deterring "federal officials from committing constitutional
wrongs."1 3 The Court in Butz also acknowledged that where
federal officials receive absolute immunity, the burden is on
the federal official to demonstrate that an "exceptional
situatio[n] exists, in which absolute immunity is essential for
the conduct of the public business."114
Applied to a situation where there is an invocation of
108. In response to Justice Brennan's dissent concerning federal immunity, the majority
argued that "Chappell made no reference to immunity principles, and Bivens itself explicitly
distinguished the question of immunity from the question of whether the Constitution directly
provides the basis for a damages action against individual officers." Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). The analytic
answer is that the availability of a damages action under the Constitution for particular
injuries . . . is a question logically distinct from immunity to such an action on the part of
particular defendants." Stanley, 483 U.S. at 684 (emphasis in original text).
109. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 693 n.10 (responding to majority's argument at 685).
110. That is, immunity for acts that an official did not know, or could not have known,
violated clearly established constitutional law. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555
(1978) (Prison Officials); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (State Hospital
Administrators); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (State Executive Officers).
111. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
112. Id. at 506.
113. Id. at 506.
114. Id. at 506-07. To meet the burden of proof, an executive, claiming absolute
immunity, must first showtthat the nature of his duties in the particular executive position was
so sensitive as to require atotal shield from liability. Harlow et al. v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 813 (1982). "He then must demonstrate that he was discharging the protected function
when performing the act for which liability is asserted." Id. at 813.
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a national security justification/defense,'15 federal officials still
bear the burden of demonstrating that the usual protection of
qualified immunity should be heightened.11 6 In the context of

national

security,

the

Court

in Schauer v. Rhodes"7

demonstrated that executive officials may receive only qualified

immunity even when the function they perform is military
decision-making. "

Justice

Brennan

argued1 9 that the

concerns the Court expressed in Chappell, the extent of
intrusion by the judiciary into military command functions, and
the effects of such, are not present in Stanley's case." He
argued that the Court could not examine Stanley's Bivens
claim in conjunction with an immunity analysis where the
officials who administered the drug to Stanley were
115. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 695-96 n.14 (1987). The government
claimed that the purpose of the LSD experimentation which Stanley participated in without
his consent was "[f]or the purpose of ascertain[ing] the effects of the drug on [soldiers'] ability
to function as soldiers, and to evaluate the validity of traditional security training . . . in
the face of unconventional, drug enhance interrogations." Brief for the United States at 3 n.1,
United States v. Stanley 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (No. 86-393) (quoting S. REP. No. 755, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., Book 1 at 411-12 (1976)). "Fears that counties hostile to the United States
would use chemical and biological agents against Americans or America's allies led to the
development of a defensive program designed to discover techniques for American intelligence
agencies to detect and counteract chemical and biological agents." S. REP No. 755 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., Book 1 at 385 (1976). See Generally Brief for the United States at 8, United
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (No. 86-393) (a history of the development of
Governmental Military drug testing).
116. "The practical consequences of a holding that no remedy has been authorized
against a public official are essentially the same as those flowing from a conclusion that the
official has absolute immunity." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 538 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
Petitioner is not absolutely immune from suit for damages arising out of
his allegedly unconstitutional conduct in performing his national security
functions. Petitioner points to no historical or common law basis for
absolute immunity for officers carrying out tasks essential to national
security And the danger that high federal officials will disregard
constitutional rights in their zeal to protect the national security, is
sufficiently real to counsel against affording such officials an absolute
immunity.
Id. at 520-24.
117. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).

118. Id. at 238-49.
119. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 697 n.17.

120. Id.
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unknown.12 1 The record in the case did not reveal what
offices the individual respondents held, what their functions
were, and the extent to which they participated in the LSD
experiments.1 2
Yet the Court grants them absolute immunity, so
long as they intentionally inflict only serviceconnected injuries, doing violence to the principle
that the extension of absolute immunity from
damages liability to all federal executive officials
would seriously erode the protection provided by
the basis constitutional guarantees."2
Justice Brennan suggested remanding the case to allow
these defendants to demonstrate that absolute immunity was
necessary to the effective performance of their functions24
Relying on precedent,"2 Justice Brennan concluded that
qualified immunity should not apply, and not absolute
immunity.1" At common law, military superiors received no
exemption from the general rule that officials may be held
accountable for their actions in damages in a civil court of
12
law.lV Subsequently, via the holding in Wilkes v. Dinsman, 8
121. Id.
122. Id. at 697.
123. Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505 (1950)).
124. Stanley, 483 U.S at 698.
125. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
508 (1978).
126. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 698. But see supra note 90.
127. Beginning with Wilson v. McKenzie, 7 Hill 95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844) (Naval officer
sued for beating and imprisoning an enlisted seaman), the New York Supreme Court
dismissed defendant officer's demurrer, noting that the English courts had allowed suits for
acts done in the exercise of military discipline. See Zillman, supra note 72, at 499. In 1849,
the Supreme Court decided Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89 (1849), where Captain
John Wilkes, fearing a mutiny, arrested and flogged Private Dinsman, placed him in irons and
confined him to prison. Id. Dinsman prevaled in civil court on charges of assault, battery,
and false imprisonment. Id. The Court, although it later reversed and remanded on faulty
jury instructions, emphasized that Captain Wilkes could not claim immunity "[f]or acts beyond
his jurisdiction, or attended by circumstances of excessive severity, arising from ill-will, a
depraved disposition, or vindictive feeling." Id. at 130 (citing Warden v. Bailey, 128 Eng. Rep.
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the Court in cases dealing with immunity of federal officials
afforded only qualified immunity to such officials. 1" Justice
Brennan in distinguishing Wilkes13 from Chappell, pointed out
that the Court did not hold that soldiers could never sue for

131
service-connected injuries inflicted by an intentional tort.
Justice Brennan next focused on the Court's ruling and
interpretation of Chappell, specifically on the "narrow
exception to the usual rule of qualified immunity for federal
officials.1 32 The language and reasoning in Chappell focused
consistently and emphatically on the "peculiar and special
relationship of the soldier to his superiors,13 and the need for

discipline between the subordinate and the commander, which

supported a holding that "[e]nlisted military personnel may not
maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior officer for
alleged constitutional violations."" Justice Brennan argued
that the majority gave short shrift to the obvious and
important factual distinction between Stanley's situation and
that in Chappell; that the defendants in Stanley did not allege
to be his superior officers. 35
2513 (1811)). On the second appeal to the Supreme Court, after the lower court reversed
and held for Captain Wilkes, the Court still did not provide an absolute immunity defense
for Wilkes. Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. 3 (12 How.) 390 (1852). Chief Justice Tanney,
while recognizing the danger to military discipline from civil suits, felt that harm to the nation
would occur if servicemen could be oppressed and injured by their commanding officers, out
of malice, ill-will, or the wantonness of power. Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 403.
128. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 400 (1849).
129. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511
(1985).
130. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 n.2 (1983). "Wilkes, however, is inapposite
because it involved a well recognized common law cause of action by a marine against his
commanding officer for damages suffered as a result of punishment and did not ask the
Court to imply a new kind of cause of action." Id.
131. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 699, 699 (1987).

132. Id. at 700.
133. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Brown, 348
U.S. 110, 112 (1954)).

134. See id. at 305.
135. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
"Instead the Court seizes upon the statement in Chappell that our analysis
in that case was guided by the concerns underlying the Feres doctrine, and
dramatically expands the carefully limited holding in Chappell, extending
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In attacking the Court's reasoning that Bivens actions
may be precluded when service-connected injuries are
concerned, Justice Brennan addressed several problems in
such an extension of Feres into the realm of Bivens claims.
First, the Bivens-type context differs significantly from a FeresFTCA context in that the latter is meant to address negligent
acts, and the former with intentional constitutional violations."
Feres and FTCA claims invoke a more precise conflict with
the judiciary interfering directly with the commandersubordinate relationship. 37 In Stanley's case however, this
conflict is not implicated. Second, two of the three rationales
underlying the Feres doctrine are entirely inapplicable to
Stanley's Bivens action."3 Thus, the heart of the majority's
analysis focused on the special nature of military discipline.
Specifically, with the need for instinctive obedience, 39 the
disruption of military affairs by factual inquiries necessitated
by a Bivens action, and the fear that "[t]he vigor of military
decisionmaking will be sapped if damages can be awarded for
an incorrect (albeit intentionally incorrect) choice."'40
In addressing the majority's concern regarding the
intrusion into military discipline, essential to military
functioning, Justice Brennan first addressed the need for
instinctive obedience.' 4' Justice Brennan pointed out that such
its reasoning beyond logic and its meaning beyond recognition."
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 701.
136. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 701.

137. Id.
138. First, in Feres the Court feared that allowing FI'CA recovery, which varies from
state to state, would impinge on the military's need for uniformity. Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950). In contrast, a Bivens claim is governed by uniform federal
constitutional law. Bivens v. Six Unkown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 393 (1971). Secondly, the Court relied on the alternative statutory remedial scheme
provided by the Veterans Benefits Act. Veterans Benefits Act, Pub. L. No. 85-857, 72 Stat.
1105 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 301 (1982 & Supp. 1987)). But, the Veterans

Benefits Act relates only to negligence and was not enacted to deal with violations of
constitutional rights. See Donaldson, ConstitutionalTorts & Military Effectiveness: A Proposed
Alternative To The Feres Doctrine, 23 A.F. L. REv. 171, 198-99 (1982-83).

139. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 704.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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instinctiveness is not at all implicated where, as here, a soldier
sues civilian officials. Second, the fear "[t]hat military affairs
might be disrupted by factual inquiries necessitated by [a]
Bivens action" ' is not, as the majority fears, in the Bivens
context. Justice Brennan pointed out that "the judiciary is
already involved

.

.

.

in cases that implicate military

judgments and decisions, ' and while it might be justified in
the FTCA context to limit suits arising from negligence,
"[u]nless the command relationship . . . is involved, these

violations [intentional violations of constitutional rights] should
receive moral condemnation and legal redress without
limitation to that accorded negligent acts." ' Finally, in regard
to interference with military decisionmaking by allowing
damage awards, Justice Brennan argues that the significant
difference between Feres and Bivens
[i]s that, in the latter, the vigorous-decision
making concern has already been taken into
account in our determination that qualified
immunity is the general rule for federal officials,
who should be required on occasion

.

.

.

to

pause and to consider whether a proposed cause
of action can be squared with the Constitution.147
142. See Note, Intramilitary Immunity And ConstitutionalTorts, 80 MIcH. L. REv. 312
(1981).
The policy argument for absolute immunity ... rests on the dubious
proposition that a serviceman is more likely to respect authority when he
has no recourse for the intentional or malicious depravation of his
constitutional rights.
The contrary idea--that safeguarding rights
compatible with military needs will engender respect for authority and
promote discipline--is more appealing.
Id. at 328. See also Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 938, 939 (1956).
143. Stanley,,483 U.S. at 705.
145. Id. at 705 n.27. Such instances include when a soldier sues for non-service
connected injuries, a civilian is injured, where there is a court review of court-martial
proceedings, and when soldiers bring claims for injunctive and declaratory relief arising from
statutory and constitutional violations. Id.
146. Id. at 704.
147. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985) (emphasis in original
text)).
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In response to the majority's insistence that the case
and the extension of Bivens needed to be based solely on a
policy judgement,1" Justice Brennan argued that the immunity
line of cases establish a clear framework for guidance in
Biven-type cases.
Were I to concede that military discipline is
somehow implicated by the award of damages
for intentional torts against civilian officials
. I would nonetheless conclude, in accord with
our usual immunity analysis, that the decisionmaking of federal officials deliberately choosing
to violate the constitutional rights of soldiers
should be impaired.149
The final part of Justice Brennan's dissent focused on
the majority's second special factor found in Chappell:
"[c]ongressional activity providing for the review and remedy
of complaints and grievances such as those presented by the
injured soldier." 5 ' Focusing on the Veterans Benefits Act
("VBA"), 151 Justice Brennan argued that the VBA is not
relevant to the case at bar because the injuries alleged stem
from pain and suffering in forms not covered or contemplated
by the VBA.152 Here, in contrast to the injuries alleged in
Chappell, there is no remedy available to Stanley.'53
As with Congress' constitutional authorization "to make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
148. Id. at 705-06. "[T]his is essentially a policy judgment, which depends upon how
much occasional, unintended impairment of military discipline one is willing to tolerate." Id.
at 705.

149. Id. at 706 (emphasis in original text).
150. Id. (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983)).
151. Various provisions of statutes provide for the serviceman harmed in the line of
duty. See 31 U.S.C. § 372 (1976).

152. See infra note 57.
153. The military court dismissed his claims under the "incident to service" test. See
infra note 25.
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' Justice Brennan advanced two arguments.
naval Forces,"154
First, such constitutional authorization does not address
"whether civilian federal officials are immune from damages
'
in actions arising from service-connected injuries."155
Second,
since any time Congress acts it does so pursuant to
constitutional authorization, to preclude Bivens claims every
time Congress has acted in a given area would effectively
preclude all Bivens claims. 5'
In sum, Justice Brennan
reiterated that

[i]n Chappell the Court found that both the imperatives
of military discipline and the congressional creation of
constitutionally adequate remedies for the alleged
violations constituted 'special factors counselling
hesitation', and refused to infer a Bivens action. In this
case, the invocation of 'military discipline' is hollow and
Congressional activity nonexistent; a Bivens action must
lie.

157

I1[. ANALYSIS

The message for plaintiffs counsel is blunt:
unless your military plaintiff was not performing
military duties, not on a military installation, not
subject to any immediate military command
relationship, and not taking advantage of any
special military privileges at the time of the
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 14.

155. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 707 (1987) (emphasis in original).
156. Id. at 707. Justice Brennan pointed out that even when considering matters most
clearly within Congress' constitutional authority, the Court has allowed Bivens claims. Id
In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245-49 (1979), the Court allowed damage remedies under

Bivens to lie against respondent United States Congressman on the basis that respondent
sexually discriminated against petitioner. Id. The Court rejected respondent's argument that
he was shielded by the Speech and Debate Clause, "the principle that legislators ought
generally to be bound by [the law] as are ordinary persons," applies.

Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 (1972)).
157. Stanye,, 483 U.S. at 707.

Id. at 246 (quoting
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negligent or wrongful government act, don't take
the case! 5 '
The Court's holding in Stanley dealt a great blow to the
Nation's established Constitutional policies that no State shall
deny any person "equal protection of the laws.' 59
By
circumventing their own analysis of whether Stanley's injuries
were inflicted in the course of military duty,"6 the Court
accepts a frightening definition to the "incident to service"
standard and applies the standard to a cause of action aimed
at redressing flagrant violations of constitutional rights. While
taking an unduly broad reading of the "incident to service"
test as applied to Stanley in this case, the Court did not
consider the injuries Stanley received once a civilian. While
the court of appeals did address Stanley's separate tort
theory,16 upon further analysis the reasoning behind the claim
was somewhat ambiguous, and under traditional theories of
tort law was wrong. Further, the court of appeals, and the
Supreme Court, fail to recognize what has been described as
an inroad to the court-created Feres doctrine, and thereby fails
62
to "reach a morally just and compelling result.'
Otherwise termed the "failure to warn" theory, this type
of tort claim is a hybrid of a continuing and separate tort
analysis. 163 The theory permits a plaintiff to recover on the
158. Zillman, supra note 72, at 512.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
160. The Court stated that "[t]he issue of service incidence, as that term is used in
Feres, was decided adversely to him by the Court of Appeals in 1981, 639 F.2d, at 1150-53,
and there is no warrant for re-examining that ruling here." Stanley, 483 U.S. at 680.
161. Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146, 1153 (5th Cir. 1981).
162. Szykowny, Duty to Warn as an Inroad to the Feres Doctrine: A Theory of Tort
Recovery for the Veteran, 43 OHIo. ST. L. J. 267, 279 (1982) [hereinafter Szykowny].
163. The continuing tort analysis is typically not recognized by the courts. Szykowny,
supra note 162, at 272. Injuries which can be traced and characterized as incident to service
under Feres are not compensable even if the injury does not physically or psychologically
manifest itself until after service in the Military. Id at 272 n.40. The separate negligent act
theory has its origins in United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954), and is based on an
entirely separate tort committed upon the former military personnel where there is virtually
no connection between the incident to service harm and the subsequent harm. Id. at 272-73.
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ground that the military owes a certain duty of care to
veterans if it intentionally and harmfully exposed them to
dangerous substances while they were in the service.' Under
such a theory, the liability attaches to the military when its
failure to warn a veteran aggravates the original wrong by
increasing the danger over time, or by causing the veteran to
To be
believe that the danger has been removed.165
successful, a plaintiff must show that there were two separate
torts; one occurring while in service, and the other after
discharge.1"
The primary case in which this theory was used, and
was successful, was Thomwell v. United States. 67 In Thornwell,
a servicemen brought suit against the United States and 29
individuals for alleged covert administration of drugs (LSD),
interrogation, and imprisonment during his active military
Additionally, Mr. Thornwell alleged that the
service.'
defendants were liable for the concealment of the
administration of the drug, and failure to provide follow-up
treatment and examination after his discharge. 69 The court
held that the Feres doctrine did not preclude Thornwell from
pursuing claims based on injuries due to conduct occurring
after his discharge. 7° The court concluded that Feres should
not apply to the post-discharge claims because Thornwell
[d]oes not allege a mere continuing negligent
omission. He claims that he was intentionally
harmed while he was on active duty and he
further claims that, after he became a civilian,
the defendants failed to exercise their duty of
164. Id at 273.

165. Id
166. Id
167. 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).

168. Id. at 344.
169. Id. at 349.
170. Id. at 352.
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care by neglecting to rescue him from the
position of danger which they had created.
Although the precise nature of the duty of care
upon which the plaintiff relies is not clear, Mr.
Thornwell's claims for in-service and out-ofservice injuries certainly involve two distinctly
separate patterns of conduct, one intentional and
one negligent. Thus, he has alleged two entirely
different torts, and even though the first tort
occurred in the course of his military service, the
171
second did not.
Therefore, the court held that Thornwell could recover to the
negligence
extent that the defendants' post-discharge
172
condition.
his
aggravated or prolonged
In addressing Stanley's separate tort theory claim, the
Supreme Court initially stated that Stanley had failed to allege
an intentional tort committed while he was in the service. 73
The court stated that "[t]he clearest way to fall within the
theory of Thomwell would be to allege an intentional or wilful
tort injuring an active duty serviceman and a negligent or
intentional failure to provide proper follow-up care which
begins after the plaintiff's discharge from the service."' 74
Even if Stanley could allege negligence on the part of the
government, 175 the court found that he failed to allege a
separate negligent act occurring "entirely after his discharge.' 76
The court stated that Stanley's
[s]ole contention was that he had been injured
171. Id. at 351.

1971)).172.

Id. at 353 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORm § 52 (4th ed.

173. Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146, 1154 (5th Cir. 1981).
174. Id.
175. The court in Thornwell indicated that a negligent act will in some circumstances
suffice as the original tort. Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344, 352 (D.D.C. 1979).
176. Stanley, 639 F.2d at 1154.
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by a series of negligently performed medical tests
during the twelve year period after his discharge,
which resulted in his injuries. There was no such
active negligence alleged to have occurred after
Stanley's discharge. Stanley has alleged merely
an act of negligence which occurred while he was
on active duty, the effects 177
of which remained
discharge.
after
uncorrected
The court made an attempt to distinguish Thornwell by
indicating that even if the reasoning in Thornwell was correct
in its conclusion that a mere failure to provide information is
a separate actionable tort, the failure to warn Stanley did not
occur "entirely after discharge.."17' The court reasons that
unlike the plaintiff in Thornwell, Stanley remained in the
service for eleven years after the administration of LSD. The
court reasoned that although the failure. to warn actually
occurred, because Stanley remained active in service when the
the Government failed to warn him, such was "incident to
service", and was thus barred under Feres.179 Therefore, the

court found that Stanley had failed to allege a negligent act
occurring entirely after his discharge thus, denying him the
separate tort theory of Thornwell. This same reasoning was
considered in Broudy v. United States,"'0 where the court
permitted a veteran to prove post-discharge negligence but
cautioned that had the government learned. of the problems
with radiation exposure while the veteran was still in the
hospital, and still in the service, the failure to warn would
have been incident to service and therefore: barred by Feres.
This leads to an absolute absurdity: "[t]he government would
have to argue that the military knew that the radiation was
dangerous and decided not to warn. By thus showing more
177. Id
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981).
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reprehensible conduct, the government can avail itself of the
Feres umbrella."''
One of the prime concerns of this theory is that
"[a]rtful pleading may be employed to elevate one continuing
1 2 Yet, the court of
act of negligence into separate wrongs.""
appeals in Stanley reverses this danger by basing its
determination on the procedural fact that Stanley did not
allege an active negligent act occurring after his discharge.'8 3
Dean Prosser has pointed out that under recognized
moral and social standards there must be a developing duty
of action when one knows of the potential serious harm to
another." 4 Similarly, section 322 of the Restatment Second
of Torts provides that
[i]f the actor knows or has reason to know that
by his conduct, whether tortious or innocent, he
has caused such bodily harm to another as to
make him helpless and in danger of further
harm, the 'actor is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent such further harm.'
The question remains: was the failure to warn Stanley
a second distinct tort? Another way to examine this question
is to understand whether Stanley's condition, as a result of
taking the LSD, was compounded from the government's
failure to warn him for a period of thirteen years?'86 It has
181.

Szykowny, supra note 162, at 273 n.55.

182. Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344, 352 (D.D.C. 1979).
183. Stanley, 639 F. Supp. at 1154. "Stanley has alleged merely an act of negligence
which occurred while he was on active duty, the effects of which remained uncorrected after
discharge." Id.
184. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 343 (4th ed. 1971).
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 (1965).
186. Use of LSD sometimes results in a syndrome "[c]haracterized by apathy,
depression, loss of primary orientation, a low anxiety threshold, increased irritability, and a
significant impairment of memory and other intellectual functions." TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC
SCIENCE OF POISONS 634 (L. Casarett & J. Doull ed. 1975). These are precisely the effects
which the LSD had on Stanley. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
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been established that after ingesting LSD, "[e]xtensive therapy
often results in significant improvement, but there never seems
to be a complete recovery of intellectual functions."1"7 It
appears that the susbsequent dissolution of Stanley's marriage,
his inability to function properly in the military, and the
periods of radical behavioral changes were a direct result of
the administration of LSD."s Such changes occur typically in
one who takes LSD."8 9 But the primary difference in Stanley's
case is that he never knew he was administered the drug.
Therefore, it can be assumed that the effects of this mindaltering drug had a heightened effect on Stanley as he did not
know what was causing his severe behavioral changes. One
can postulate that if Stanley was treated and told about the
ingestion of the drug, his condition would have significantly
improved, and the beating of his wife and children which
eventually led to the dissolution of his marriage might have
been avoided. Under both a moral and social standard, and
further under principles of tort law, Stanley at the least should
have succeeded on the continuing tort theory. Prior to
administering LSD to Stanley, the government had definite
knowledge that future harm to him via the drug was
inevitable."ag The inevitable occured, and Stanley's life, after
originally consenting to a supposedly harmless experiment, was
forever changed.

187. ToxicoLOGy, supra note 186, at 634.
188. Id at 633-34.
Mood alterations also occur.
LSD also disrupts logical intentional
thought processes without causing loss of consciousness .
Interpersonal relationships are intensified under the influence of LSD
. . . Acute anxiety reactions also occur. This state is characterized by
panic resulting from an individual's rigid refusal to tolerate the alterations
that have occurred in his self-perception and his feeling of gross
helplessness and loss of control."
Id.
189. Id
190. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The extension of the Feres doctrine to include violations
of constitutional rights is alarming. The broad application of
the doctrine not only effectively penalizes the servicemen
whose constitutional rights have been egregiously violated, but
has been expanded to preclude recovery where there is an
intentional tort, and a failure to warn of the dangers of the
original tort.1 91 There have been inroads into the doctrine 1"
primarily due to its apparent harshness. As Justice O'Connor
points out, and in light of the specific facts in Stanley, "[n]o
judicially crafted rule should insulate from liability the
involuntary and unknowing human experimentation alleged to
have occurred in this case. 1' 93

The standards that the Nuremberg Military Tribunals
developed to judge the behavior of the Nazi medical doctors
stated that the "[v]oluntary consent of the human subject is
absolutely essential . . . to satisfy moral, ethical, and legal

concepts. ' 94 This vital principle has been violated in the case
of Stanley, and the broad application of a military defense,
narrowly established, has grown in the face of flagrant
violations of the most sacred individual rights.
Michael L Braverman
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